Introduction
Increasing numbers of countries are passing climate change legislation. Practically all major emitters of greenhouse gases have in place laws to control emissions, conserve energy or promote cleaner forms of energy production, while vulnerable countries are taking steps to prepare for the impacts of climate change (Nachmany et al., 2014) . These laws do not add up to a global response that would limit climate change to less than 2 o C of global mean warming, but they provide the context in which a new international treaty on climate change is negotiated.
The emergence of climate legislation can be explained by a combination of domestic factors, such as the energy-economic context and the interests of domestic actors, and international factors, such as treaty obligations (Falkner 2013, Never and Betz 2014) . Oates and Portney (2005) , Congleton (1992) and Hahn (1990) analyse domestic environmental policy and emphasise the crucial role of political institutions and national interest groups (see also Never 2012) . But there is also an international dimension.
Approaches to environmental policy diffuse across jurisdictions, as policy makers learn from each other and "good practice" spreads Jordan and Huitema 2014) . The global public good nature of climate change adds a further international dimension in that climate action is subject to international coordination (Kroll and Shogren 2008, Barrett 2007 ).
The objective of this paper is to identify key international factors that contribute to the emergence of climate change legislation. A parallel paper using the same data also looks at domestic factors . We contrast the role of policy diffusion -an autonomous, bottom up process through which climate policy may spread -with the effect of formal treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, which offer a more directed approach to policy coordination.
We find statistically that both factors have a positive influence on the emergence of climate change legislation. The effect of policy diffusion is direct and simple. The propensity to pass climate legislation increases with the number of climate laws passed elsewhere. The effect of international treaties is more complex. International commitments increase legislative action, but only in countries where the obligations bind.
Treaties also offer a further incentive: the prospect of global leadership. We find that assuming a global leadership role, by hosting an international summit, can unblock domestic obstacles and lead to more climate legislation We derive these results from a powerful new dataset, which we helped assemble over a series of climate legislation surveys (Townshend et al., 2013; Townshend et al., 2011) .
Our analysis is the first to use the extended 2014 version of the data. A distinct feature of the surveys is that they were conducted in close cooperation with legislators from the parliaments concerned (Nachmany et al., 2014) .
The data reveal legislative action on climate change since 1990 in 66 jurisdictions -65 nation states, plus the European Union as a block -which were chosen to cover almost 90% of global greenhouse gas emissions. There are important caveats about the dataset : it focuses on action at the national level, that is, it excludes state, province or city-level activities.
There is no analysis of the quality or merit of individual laws (for example, the number of exemptions granted to affected industries), the degree to which a law is implemented or enforced, nor the eventual effect it has had.
A particular problem for our research question is that when laws are amended the database only records the latest version, thus omitting earlier activities. As in our analysis, the main focus of these papers tends to be on policy adoption, rather than the post-adoption dynamics of laws. "Policy" is sometimes unpacked into its constituent parts (e.g., objectives and instruments) to explore whether diffusion differs between these elements. The pertinent literature identifies a broad set of driving forces, which includes international factors (such as international norms, knowledge transfer and pressure to conform), domestic drivers (such as domestic actors, institutions, interests and capacities), as well as the characteristics of the policy at hand (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Busch et al., 2005; Kern et al., 2001 ).
Small-N comparative studies offer detailed descriptions of the mechanisms and processes of policy-making. However it is useful to complement their insights with quantitative results from larger data sets. The econometric analysis of policy diffusion has a long tradition (Graham et al. 2012) , often using event history or hazard models (e.g., Berry 1990, 1992) . Krause (2011) studies the adoption of climate policies among US cities, while Matisoff and Edwards (2014) analyse the diffusion of clean energy policies across US states. Bernauer et al. (2010) , Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) , Sauquet (2014) and von Stein (2008) 
The Emergence of Climate Legislation
The basic science of climate change has been known for over a century. Yet, it became an issue of wider policy concern only in the 1990s, after the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Theoretical Framework
Econometric techniques can shed further light on the dynamics of climate change legislation described qualitatively above. Our particular interest is in international factors that may have driven the adoption of climate change legislation. In particular, we are interested in two different, but complementary processes.
On the one hand we are interested in policy diffusion as a decentralised, bottom-up process through which climate policy spreads across jurisdictions. On the other hand, there are formal international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, which offer a more directed, centralised approach to policy coordination. We also seek to unpack the channels through which an international treaty may influence domestic legislation. The most obvious way is through binding commitments, but there may be other incentives. In particular, Townshend et al. (2011) International policy diffusion takes place "when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries" (Simmons et al. 2006 ). In the context of climate policy, econometric studies of diffusion include Bernauer et al. (2010) and Sauquet (2014) , who analyses countries' ratification behaviour of environmental treaties. Sauquet (2014) identifies two counteracting effects.
On the one hand, action taken by other countries can encourage free-riding. If the problem is addressed by others, countries may feel less of a need to act themselves. On the other hand, policy experience is known to diffuse across countries through knowledge spill-overs, learning effects and peer pressure (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Busch et al., 2005; Kern et al., 2001) . If policy diffusion occurs, the climate action a country undertakes is likely to depend on prior climate legislation by other countries. We therefore test the power of policy diffusion by regressing climate legislation against the number of laws passed in all other countries in the sample.
Hypothesis 2. Binding obligations under an international treaty are likely to boost the passage of climate change laws. That is, we expect to see an increase in climate legislation after the Kyoto Protocol was signed, at least in Annex 1 countries.
International treaties like the Kyoto Protocol impose commitments that may need to be implemented through new domestic legislation. Although the sanctions for noncompliance tend to be soft (Barrett 2007) , countries face reputational risks if they renege on their international pledges. We test this hypothesis on the Kyoto Protocol and explore whether the passage of climate laws increased in the years after the treaty was signed.
We consider the year of signature, rather than ratification, to avoid a potential endogeneity bias 3 . We do not consider participation in the UNFCCC, since every country in the sample signed it in 1992 so there is not much variation in the data. Governments willing to pass climate change legislation will face opposition from vested interests. The influence of veto players on environmental policy making is a standard feature of political economy models (e.g. Fredriksson et al., 2007; von Stein 2008) .
Hosting a high-profile international meeting thrusts the host nation into a position of international leadership. It has been argued that this may overcome internal resistance and motivate subsequent climate legislation (Townshend et al., 2011) . Lockwood (2013) observes for example how the prominence given to climate change at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005 contributed to a "groundswell of public interest and concern" in the UK that led to the 2008 Climate Change Act. We test the hypothesis by focusing on a different, more regular kind of summit, the annual conference of the parties to the UNFCCC.
Methodology and Main Results
The 2014 version of the climate legislation survey (Nachmany et al., 2014) y it = a + bI it +g X it +q i +n t +e it (1)
In the main specification y it represents the total number of climate laws adopted in country i at year t, although we also run regressions for particular types of laws (e.g.  Host: hosting a COP, dummy for the year of the meeting and subsequent two years.
We estimate equation (1) using a negative binomial fixed effects model where the log of the expected count is a function of the predictor variables. The count model is suitable since we are dealing with a count dependent variable characterized by over-dispersion (i.e. the mean is lower than the variance) and events (e.g. law adoptions) that a country can experience more than once (Allison and Waterman 2002; Trivedi 1998, 2010) . These features prevent the use of hazard models, which have been employed to study policy adoption elsewhere (e.g., Berry 1990, 1992) . The negative binomial is also best suited to deal with the large number of zero entries (i.e. countryyears without legislative action), which represent about 80 per cent of all observations. We find strong evidence of policy diffusion. Countries are encouraged to pass climate legislation by the legislative activities of other countries. Diffusion clearly dominates any temptation to free-ride. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the stock of laws adopted previously by all other nations is a very powerful predictor of additional legislative activity.
In contrast, the observed impact of the Kyoto Protocol is unexpected. The post-Kyoto period of 1998 to 2001 was characterized by lower legislative activity than normal across the full sample of countries. This counter-intuitive result is inconsistent with hypothesis 2 and will require further exploration. As we will see below, it could be due to the fact that Kyoto imposed commitments only on a small number of countries or because the Kyoto effect takes longer to materialise. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Consistent with hypothesis 3, the international negotiations appear to have a galvanising effect on the countries that host the annual conference of the parties. While this establishes correlation, we cannot completely preclude a reverse causality. The UNFCCC might prefer host countries with legislation in the pipeline and/or countries might volunteer to host a COP to showcase their domestic achievements. To test this alternative, we ran the model with an additional dummy for the two years before a COP.
We do not find a significant effect for the new variable, which lends support to the original hypothesis. The hypothesis is supported by anecdotal evidence. Officials from host countries often emphasise how hosting the COP changed political dynamics and facilitated the passage of legislation (Townshend et al., 2013; Nachmany et al., 2014) .
Japan and Mexico are prominent countries which passed major climate change laws within a few years of hosting a COP.
The results for specific types of climate legislation (columns 2-8) are broadly similar.
Policy diffusion and hosting a COP are strongly associated with additional climate legislation in all regressions. However, a note of caution is required in interpreting the results in columns (2)- (8): given the smaller number of non-zero observations when considering specific types of law, the evidence becomes less robust that the analysis of all climate laws in column (1).
Evidence Related to Particular Country Contexts
We then repeat the same analysis for a series of restricted data sets. This can shed light on legislative dynamics in particular political contexts or for particular groups of countries. Table 2 reports on six such regressions. In smaller datasets the number of zero observations (that is country-years without legal activity) becomes more pertinent statistically. To maintain a sufficient number of non-zero observations, the restricted sample estimations are carried out only for the total number of climate laws.
In the first set of regressions (columns 1 and 2) we explore whether different dynamics are at play depending on the political orientation of the government (which in turn is a reflection of voter preferences, Lee et al. 2004) . To do so, we split the sample into periods of left-wing and right-wing administrations. Left-wing governments are less frequent; that sample is considerably smaller, and the results correspondingly weaker. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (a) We were unable to account for the business cycle and the level of GDP, as the negative binomial model failed to converge when including these variables.
There is evidence that left-wing governments are more inclined to pass environmental legislation (Neumayer 2003) , although the link between party politics and environmental policy can be complex (Folke 2014) . Table 2 suggests that there are also differences in the way right-wing and left-wing governments are influenced by international factors.
Policy diffusion is strong under both types of government. However, each responds differently to international treaties. Under right-wing governments the galvanising effect of hosting an international summit is much stronger, while left-wing governments are more likely to follow up on international commitments. Left-wing governments were more inclined to pass climate legislation in the aftermath of Kyoto, while the opposite happened under right-wing governments.
Columns 3 and 4 report separate results for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. The results on policy diffusion and hosting a COP are broadly consistent with the main findings, although policy diffusion in non-Annex 1 countries is no longer statistically significant. We assign this to the diverse nature of the non-Annex 1 grouping. This makes it more difficult to capture diffusion effects, which are strongest among countries with similar histories and backgrounds.
Perhaps of more interest is the difference in sign for the Kyoto dummy. For Annex I countries the coefficient is positive (although not statistically significant, probably due to the small number of observations), while it is negative outside Annex 1. This suggests that the low level of climate legislation following Kyoto that we observed in the full sample (Table 1) is due to the trend in non-Annex I countries, which represent 70 per cent of our sample. For Annex 1 countries, which have binding obligations under Kyoto, the Protocol has led to the expected increase in legislative activity.
To further test this hypothesis we perform a t-test to compare the average number of laws passed in different time periods (Table 3) . We find statistically higher legislation activity in Annex I countries after 2001, that is, a few years after the protocol was signed in
December 1997 and the ratification wave began. The difference persists until 2009, a year after the Kyoto compliance period began. After that point the effect levels off, perhaps because climate action is increasingly expected from all countries. Table 3 . T-test of the difference in legislation activity between Annex I and Non-Annex I countries in different time periods (average laws per country and year). The last two regressions (columns 5 and 6) split the sample into countries with more or less advanced democracies (where the latter are defined as having a Polity2 score of less than 8, Fankhauser et al., 2014) . The two sub-samples are more balanced than for the other split regressions, with a similar number of observations in each. The most striking result is the significant increase in climate legislation after Kyoto among advanced democracies. The opposite holds for less democratic regimes. The former grouping includes the majority of Annex 1 countries, but it is also possible that advanced democracies are more concerned about reputation effects. This is consistent with Neumayer (2002) , who found that democracies exhibit a stronger international environmental commitment.
The host country effect is positive only for advanced democracies, but since 17 out of 19 COP meetings until 2013 have taken place in advanced democracies, the absence of an effect in weaker democracies is not surprising. As before, we find evidence of a diffusion effect in both sub-samples.
Conclusions
Despite slow progress in the international negotiations, governments around the world have started to legislate on climate change. They enact provisions not just to prepare for the impacts of a changing climate (where there are clear domestic incentives to act) but also to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (where there might have been temptation to await a new global treaty). A key concern of legislators is the cleaner production and more efficient use of energy, but climate laws also cover transport, agriculture, forestry and a host of other activities. This paper analyses the international driving forces behind the adoption of such legislation, using a powerful data set of climate legislation since 1990. The paper is not interested in the detailed workings or the technical content of these laws, although this is clearly an important area of research and policy practice. Our interest is how international drivers may have contributed to the passage of the laws. We contrast the autonomous process of policy diffusion across countries with the more formal incentives provided by international treaties.
The debate so far, both practical and theoretical, has focused heavily on the importance of international treaties. We find some evidence of a commitment effect arising from the Kyoto Protocol, but only in countries with binding treaty obligations. . Legislative activity in Annex 1 countries has been significantly higher than in non-Annex 1 countries in the years following Kyoto, but there is no evidence that the Kyoto Protocol has increased overall legislative activities across all countries. This points to the need for a more comprehensive treaty that binds in all major emitters.
International treaties also have another effect. Hosting a climate summit -which catapults the host into a position of environmental leadership -is associated with additional domestic legislation in subsequent years. It appears that international media presence and pressure to lead by example can change the domestic discourse and push climate change up the political agenda. The effect is very strong statistically, and as such important, but it is of less significance in terms of the global number of laws, given the relatively small number of countries that have hosted a summit.
In contrast, we find clear evidence of the power of international policy diffusion. The propensity to legislate is heavily influenced by the passage of climate change laws elsewhere. The effect is significant and positive for all types of climate legislation and in all the country groupings we analyse. This diffusion mechanism, which is at work outside the formal architecture of the UNFCCC, has perhaps been under-appreciated so far, although the debate is increasingly about more diverse forms of global governance (Stavins and Ji, 2014 ).
More work is needed to unpack and understand this diffusion effect. For example, our analysis does not tell us whether the process works through peer pressure or intergovernmental learning, although the literature is beginning to shed light on this question (e.g., Jordan and Huitema, 2014) . It would also be fruitful to differentiate further between different peer groups and address questions of country interdependency (sometimes referred to as Galton's problem, Braun and Gilardi, 2006) . We measure the diffusion effect by the number of laws passed in all other countries, but it is reasonable to assume that it will differ depending on the cultural and economic ties between countries.
This may be worth exploring further (see also Sauquet, 2014) .
It is worth recalling that we do not assess the quality of laws or progress in their implementation. Our approach is purely enumerative, based on the number of laws that have been passed, and of course more laws do not necessarily equate to stronger climate policy. Individual laws will differ in their ambition (e.g. their carbon targets), stringency Nevertheless, we believe our results put the spotlight on an important set of international drivers that is wider than just the commitment effect of global treaties. While a new climate treaty is essential, our results caution against focusing exclusively on formal international commitments as the sole solution to the climate problem. Climate change is a global collective action problem that requires international coordination. However, it appears that legislative action at the country level could be equally important in creating momentum through the international diffusion of policy, and that this might be a possible route to unlock the stalemate in the international negotiations.
Technical Annex
We use a negative binomial fixed effects model to estimate different versions of the following equation:
Where y it represents the number of climate laws adopted in country i at year t. The vector I it indicates the international factors of interest (discussed in the main text), while vector X it contains control variables. We also include a full set of country and year fixed effects (and a random error term). The vector of controls includes the following economic and political economy variables (see Fankhauser et al., 2014 for further detail):
 The presence of a flagship law, which sets the basis of subsequent legislative activity.
 GDP per capita as an indicator of the socio-economic context, taken from the IMF's statistics database.
 The cyclical component of GDP as a measure of the business cycle, computed through a Hodrick-Prescott filter (Doda 2014) .
 Political institutions variables from Beck et al. (2001 Beck et al. ( , updated in 2012 , including dummies for presidential systems, for the political orientation of the executive and for the electoral cycle (year of election and year before an election).
 Democracy variables from the Polity IV dataset, including the strength of democracy (using the polity2 index) and constraints on the executive (i.e. whether the party of the executive has an absolute majority in the legislative).
As a robustness check we also estimate the model using logit fixed effects, which measures the (binary) probability of passing at least one law in a particular country and year. That is, rather than counting the number of laws passed each year, the dependent variable is binary, taking a value of 1 if at least one law was passed in a country-year and 0 otherwise. The results are broadly consistent and therefore not reported here.
